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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Corporate elites in the context of religion and 
secularism in Turkey 
Abstract 
Drawing on discourse analyses of 36 in-depth interviews with elite businesspeople from 
Turkey, the study identifies the networking patterns of new and established business elites in 
the context of economic liberalization and socio-religious transformation of the country. 
Through a comparative analysis of the so-called secular and religious elite networks, we 
demonstrate the role of institutional actors, such as the government and identity networks, 
based on religion and place of birth, in shaping the form and content of social networks 
among business elites in Turkey. In order to achieve this, we operationalize Bourdieu’s 
notion of the theory of practice and Granovetter’s theory of social networks, illustrating the 
utility of combining these approaches in explicating the form and content of social networks 
in their situated contexts in which power and divergent interests are negotiated. 
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Introduction 
 
Studies on business elites seem to have attracted limited attention in spite of the appeals by 
prominent authors (Pettigrew, 1992; Whittington, 2004; Savage and Williams, 2008; Zald 
and Lounsbury, 2010). Whittington (2004:62) stresses the need for a sociological agenda 
interested in “understanding strategy’s elites”, since their actions may have important 
repercussions for society. Drawing on a field study with in-depth interviews, we identify the 
liberal policies and conservative forces prevailing in the Turkish context on business 
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networks of the corporate elites. The adoption of liberalization policy in 1980, with Islamic 
tendencies increasingly surfacing in the same period, makes the Turkish business milieu a 
valuable setting in which to investigate the impact of the context on corporate elite business 
networks. Businesspeople’s1 associations, together with their respective ideologies and 
member profiles, are investigated in a way to assess the interplay of their form and substance 
with the changing conditions, primarily borne out of the liberalization of economic policies 
and an increased emphasis on religion.  
 
By exploring multiple actors and their positions, we are able to reveal relationships of power 
in its given emic context, drawing on Bourdieu and Granovetter’s scholarship, and we bring 
an assessment of power and context in order to develop social network theory by adding to it 
a macro-context. We believe that this is important in understanding contexts such as Turkey, 
which falls outside the traditional image of Western theorization. Assessing history and place 
when reading social networks can help us draw an emic understanding, which emanates from 
the original framing of social phenomena drawing on local data, of relevant processes, and 
freeing our theorization from etic, which draws on established frames based on Western 
concepts of social network formation, the transposition of which may not be so suitable in the 
case of Turkey. We believe that the absence of a macro perspective in social network 
theorization is also problematic at the source of much social network theorization. In fact, 
providing a macro context in Western theorization can delineate fine distinctions between 
countries and histories which shape our understanding of social networks in the Western 
world, which is not a monolithic, uniform entity. We demonstrate that in order to understand 
social network, we need to move towards a multi-institutional and identity framework and 
                                                          
1
The original title of these associations can be translated as “Businessmen” associations. However, all of them 
have female members as well. For this reason, throughout the paper, we prefer to use the term 
“Businesspeople”. 
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explore the significant role of identity, based on religion, secularism and even place of birth, 
in the case of Turkey, as well as over-arching aims, such as capitalist expansion and political 
domination in shaping the form and content of social networks.  
 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the work, we draw on theories from sociology, political 
science and management. Thus, using elite theories (Carroll, 2008; Scott, 2008), and social 
network perspectives, we unveil the relationship between the context and elite networks. The 
analysis of our findings is organized around levels of macro, meso and micro relations among 
corporate elites. We have chosen this multi-level perspective as our thematic focus, as 
religious and secular identity features differently in corporate relations at each level.  
 
Drawing on Granovetter and Bourdieu in order to understand corporate elites’ 
networks 
Two divergent approaches are evident in the theorization of social networks in their given 
setting. First, Granovetter’s theory of social networks explains that human relations are not 
conjugated only in terms of instrumental rationality, but also of sociability, approval, status 
and power (Granovetter, 1985).  Second, Bourdieu’s theory of practice illustrates the relative 
stability of capitals, choices and chances of individuals and networks across fields of 
relations, with particular reference to his work on elite reproduction (Authors, 2006). 
Dynamism and stability are evident in both authors’ scholarship. While power and resources 
present the stable component for both authors, sociability in Granovetter’s work and 
deployment of resources in Bourdieu’s work represent the dynamic aspect of social relations. 
Economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals constitute a complementary system of 
actors’ acquisitions and capabilities in different levels of the action; money, culture, 
relationships and titles are thus mobilized as resources. According to Bourdieu, all capitals 
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function in fact as symbolic capital, as they are socially acknowledged, given that they 
procure symbolic effects (Bourdieu, 2003:347). Granovetter’s notion of sociability and 
Bourdieu’s notion of different forms of capital present us with possibilities of seeing the 
dynamic practice of individual choice in the context of relatively stable social and economic 
relations.  Combined together, Granovetter and Bourdieu’s theoretical approaches promise to 
capture the coexistence of dynamism and stability, in other words, change and continuity in 
social networks (Authors, 2012). This study identifies the networking patterns of new and 
established business elites in the context of economic liberalization and socio-religious 
transformation of the country. Through a comparative analysis of the so-called secular and 
religious elite networks, we demonstrate the significance of context in understanding social 
networks as sites, where power and interests are negotiated. Developing Granovetter’s theory 
of social networks, we mobilize concepts from Bourdieusian sociology and demonstrate the 
significant role of the field, presented as institutional actors such as the government, and 
identity formations based on religion or place in shaping the form and content of social 
networks among business elites in Turkey. 
 
Instead of emphasizing similarities that engender trust in human relationships, Granovetter 
initially stressed that action develops, rather, in a network of seemingly less-affective, or 
weak ties, and that the use by actors results in a type of relationship involving a greater 
number of individuals (Granovetter, 1973:1369). He also argues that not every weak tie, but 
rather the ties capable of establishing direct and unique links between unconnected actors 
(bridges), have the capacity to shape an effective relationship (Granovetter, 1985:208). 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the field illustrates, however, that an individual’s 
endowment of symbolic and material resources (i.e. different forms of capital) renders their 
actions predictable among a milieu of actors.  
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Although the emergence and development of business networks in Turkey have some 
divergent aspects vis-à-vis Granovetter’s weak ties approach, the crucial role played by 
bridges in a network of business relationships seems to display similarities. Instead of 
communal relationships, which are based on proximity, familiarity, and trust, newly 
emerging networks of businesspeople in Turkey offer their adherents quite a different type of 
cooperation. Although they seem to have in their formation implicit, yet ideologically-driven 
qualities, such as religious orientation, conservatism, protectionism, secular and modern 
conceptions of the world, they, in fact, tend to form a new kind of ad hoc entity to resist the 
pressures and necessities of globalization.  Drawing on Bourdieu, it is possible to explicate 
how a new set of rules, forms and substantial network relationships emerge with new elites. 
While Granovetter accounts for the dynamism in networks, Bourdieu’s approach allows us to 
present dynamism in the context of stability in the broad field of relations. Lounsbury and 
Ventresca (2003) claim that Bourdieu’s approach to the concept of capital, and, consequently, 
to the meaning of social relationships, instigated the rise of a new structuralism in 
management studies.  This approach emphasizes the comprehension of the connection 
between intra-organizational networks and broader societal dynamics that influence the 
prospects for voice in specific surroundings.  The impact of Bourdieu’s theory (1979, 1980) 
on the production of domination through social capital has thus interwoven a wide range of 
critical reflections in management and organization studies. 
 
Granovetter (1983) has further developed his initial theoretical model with other empirical 
data, which confirm that weak ties in inter-firm relationships facilitate the creation of 
cooperation and coordination in the national network of economic actors. The capitals of 
Bourdieu (1979) are utilized to assess characteristics of network members, as well as their 
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actions towards domination. Deployment of capital to accrue symbolic power in a relatively 
stable field of institutional relations presents the dynamic aspect of Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory, we show the importance of social capital, 
as well as economic and cultural capital, in shaping the context of power and influence in 
Turkish business elites. Our analysis on the formation, structure and functionality of business 
associations in Turkey reveals both an articulation with the network-basis perspective 
especially that developed by Granovetter, and a re-evaluation and micro-adaptation of 
Bourdieu’s notion of capital in today’s changing Turkish business world. 
 
Burt (2005) proposes, in his challenging but complementary approach to Granovetter, a 
consideration of a relatively underestimated aspect of the network system, and focuses on 
“structural holes”. He accentuates the contribution of network relationships to the enrichment 
of social capital. According to Burt, a network rich in holes (unconnected persons or clusters 
of relationships) is more promising than that paved by familiar connections, because 
relatedness depends on the communicative capacity offered by the discontinuous network.  
Unknown, unexplored identities and beliefs can be an effective source of multiplying social 
capital (Burt, 2005:17). On the other hand, Townley (2002:561) criticizes the taken-for-
granted characteristic of the modernist rationalistic and mechanical models which try to 
analyze the macro-structures, but often underestimate the importance of the “micro-physics 
of power.”However, in this study we draw attention to power and domination within and 
around the businesspeople networks, which are characterized by a unique set of divisions 
across identity lines in Turkey. We illustrate how business networks, which are seemingly 
divided across identity lines of Islamism, secularism and communitarianism, have 
interconnections in the form of joint projects and shared aims such as market expansion.  
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Drawing a distinction between price system (universalistic instrumental rationality), 
associative system (particularistic instrumental rationality), moral system (universalistic 
substantive rationality) and communal system (particularistic substantive rationality), Biggart 
and Delbridge (2004) classify major forms of exchange based on the openness of the group 
towards outsiders (universalistic/particularistic) and their relation to instrumental logic 
(direction of the calculus between means and ends). Most Turkish business associations seem 
to be characterized by a blend of moral and communal systems. The newly rising ones, in 
particular, appear to prioritize in-group harmony through an apparent ideological or moral 
motivation, paving the way to integration with the global market.  
 Instead, she proposes a notion of organization which is complex, interactive and dynamic, 
consisting of multiple and complex interactions and circular causality.  
Drawing on Bourdieu allows us to re-theorize context as a significant aspect of network 
relationships: political context, in particular the interplay of religion, state, trade unions and 
employers, is ignored, or remains limited to narrow conceptions of stakeholder approach 
(Rowley, 1997; Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; Moliterno and Mahony, 2011) in network theory, 
which assumes that context is fixed, and not relevant to such theorization. In the European 
setting, we need to consider context more keenly, as the institutional differences are often 
outcomes of unique historical paths. For example, in their review of the diversity 
management field, Authors (2011) identify that discourses and practices in this field of 
management are shaped by both macro-economic forces of liberalization and social changes, 
such as the decline of social solidarity and a surge of individualism. They also demonstrate 
that institutional actors, such as trade unions, employers’ unions, professional bodies, 
universities and consulting businesses, play important roles in negotiating the form and 
structure of the field. They use the Bourdieusian concept of the field in order to bring a 
macro-economic and social dimension to our understanding of social networks. The concept 
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of the field allows us to bring in history, place and relationship among actors in order to 
understand how certain practices and network ties are maintained.  
 
We draw on the concepts used by Granovetter and Bourdieu, in order to frame stability and 
change in the context of corporate elites in Turkey. Instead of taking each theoretical point of 
view as an exclusive reference to stability or dynamism, we prefer to conceive of them in a 
more dialectical perspective. In other words, we did not try to polarize both thinkers as 
representatives of stability and dynamism, but we extracted conceptual aspects from their 
theory through which change and structure have been seen as complementary forces. 
Bourdieu, especially, can be easily misunderstood because of his emphasis on the structural 
components of social facts. He conceives social action to be derived from actors’ intentional 
reasoning. However, such an individual orientation of action is limited as it operates in 
structurally determined, yet never absolutely frozen, social frameworks. Two such 
frameworks are habitus –internalized assumptions in a given cultural heritage (Bourdieu, 
2003:200; Bourdieu, 2000:263), and field – a domain of action in which different kinds of 
capital are deployed in, more or less, the same logic (Bourdieu, 2003:24). Moreover, we took 
into account that Bourdieu developed his theory in the relatively more established social 
equilibrium and less dynamic class structure of France in the 1970s. Although it has been 
conceived in, and for, a specific historical and social context, Bourdieu’s theory has larger 
conceptual extensions. We did not profit from Bourdieu’s macro-sociological analysis simply 
for its historical specificity, nor for its emphasis on stable aspects of social facts. We tried to 
understand the economic elites of Turkey in a stability-change dialectical axis, as both 
complementary and conflicting forces, that make the existing complexity and interpenetration 
of social networks and relations in the business world. As summarized in Table 1, we show 
through Granovetter’s and Bourdieu’s theoretical frameworks that economic elites’ 
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associations act as both processes of structuration and matrixes of new actions. We 
conceptualize business associations not as static and impermeable structures, but, on the 
contrary, as highly active and communicating fields. In such a context, besides their capacity 
to keep social structural peculiarities in their institutional dimension (reproduction of a 
certain in-group culture), they also have the potential to animate new quests, demands and 
orientations which create  dynamism (change). Thus, while emphasizing the capacity of the 
association to generate power, we show that this implicates a naturally formed status and 
approval within and outside the business network, which functions as a field that keeps a 
certain balance of capitals. The field furnishes the necessary framework of action for the 
perpetuation of approval and status, together with, the constant maintenance of power-
generating mechanisms (e.g. keeping the relationships dynamic and convertible in business 
actions through the know-how and business opportunities created by the association). The 
same field also acts as a matrix of change, due to its capacity to instigate cooperation and 
coordination between members. For this, capitals that serve to keep a structure are also used 
to realize operations of readjustment through their dynamic aspects, resulting in the 
establishment of new opportunities and benefits. The latter is not only conceived in a material 
sense, but also as a possibility to create a sphere of sociability. A business association is also 
a social milieu, which is exclusively reconfigured through the capacity of the actor on 
deployment of capitals. In sum, aspects of stability are tightly dependent on those of change. 
 
Table1: Concepts of Granovetter and Bourdieu in order to understand stability and change 
Scholars Stability Change 
Granovetter Power 
Approval  
Status 
Cooperation and 
Coordination 
Sociability 
Bourdieu Different forms of capital 
The field 
Deployment of capitals 
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Thus, using Bourdieusian concept of the field, we bring a macro-economic and social 
dimension to our understanding of social networks in the case of corporate elites. Drawing 
upon the view that “elites are those groups that hold or exercise domination within a society 
or within a particular area of life” (Scott, 2008:32), we have defined business elites as the 
leading executive figures (such as chairperson, vice chairperson and CEO) of the largest 
companies. This definition is also consistent with previous studies, which perceive corporate 
elite as “a configuration of capitalists (major shareholders and top executives) and organic 
intellectuals occupying positions of ultimate authority within leading corporations” (Carroll, 
2008:47). Savage and Williams (2008) claim that although elites are associated with “the 
holding and exercising power”, elite research seems to overemphasize the power. In fact, 
business elites and entrepreneurial class in late-industrializing countries prosper under the 
direction and influence of the state (Öniş and Türem, 2002), which may significantly 
constrain the power of the corporate elite. In the Middle East as well, power is concentrated 
at the national level and incumbents of top state positions are outstandingly powerful (Harik, 
1980). Corporate elites’ power base is very dependent on their relationship to their 
governments in Middle Eastern countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Ali, 2010), Egypt 
(Kaboub, 2013) and Turkey (Buğra, 1994), among others. Case (2005), showing government 
support to the business elites in Malaysia, another predominantly Islamic country, points to 
the ethnic fault lines among the corporate elites. In fact, Savage and Williams (2008) state 
that elite research seems also to overestimate the cohesion.  Elites may be internally split 
along the lines of ideology, religion and ethnicity, among others (Scott, 2008), which, in turn, 
may influence elite networks in terms of change and stability.  
 
Turkey, as a late-industrialized country in the Middle East, has a strong state tradition that 
makes the business life dependent on the state. Furthermore, the business elites display 
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factions with different characteristics that limit their cohesion as a group. Therefore, studying 
elite networks in the changing context of Turkey contributes to our understanding of their 
change and stability in relation to the institutional environment. The following section 
presents the dynamics of the Turkish context and formation of different elite networks. 
 
Contextual assessment of Turkey in the process of economic liberalization and socio-
religious transformation 
 
Turkey is a country of civil law, and its legal system contributes to the central role of the state 
in the Turkish business system (Authors, 2012). Consistent with the predictions of the Legal 
Origins theory, the economy is mostly guided by state-desired allocations rather than market-
based outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008). Turkish business context is typically characterized by 
family-controlled, diversified big business groups (Guillén, 2001), whose development is 
encouraged by the state (Buğra, 2002; Başkan, 2010; Buğra, 2010). The intervention of the 
state in business life is through “particularistic relations” with businessmen rather than “rule 
based formal institutional arrangements” (Buğra, 2002:188). The state forms partnerships 
with these businesses and provides credit from state banks and low cost inputs (Buğra, 1994). 
The intricate nature of the relationship between the state and the business firms necessitates a 
careful handling of this link, and forces owning families to take part in the management of 
their companies (Buğra, 1994). Despite the relatively stable characteristics of businesses 
where the state is extremely powerful and dominant, there have been significant changes in 
the political, economic and social life in the last two decades in Turkey which have affected  
corporate elites’ networks.  
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These basic characteristics of the business system in Turkey continue, in spite of the major 
macroeconomic policy shifts. Turkish economic policy reached a breaking point at the 
beginning of 1980. The preceding decade was subject to a high inflation rate, coupled with 
the erratic regulatory regimes caused by political instability, which made high levels of 
uncertainty the basic characteristic of doing business in Turkey (Yurtoglu, 2004).  
Abandoning the import substitution policy that had been focusing on the domestic market, a 
trade liberalization programme based on export promotion was launched in the early 1980s 
(Yurtoglu, 2000).  Turkey was to adapt herself to the realities and requisites of the global 
economy and globalization process, which demanded a “restructuration” of the national 
economy.  
 
Therefore, the system of mixed economy was abandoned, state economic enterprises were 
privatized, and a series of neo-liberal policies were launched in order to abandon the existing 
“nationalist development model” in favour of the transition to global capitalism (Türe, 
2008:89).  In 1986, the Istanbul Stock Exchange was founded. Economic liberalization also 
introduced notions such as human resource strategies into the Turkish business context 
(Ercek, 2006; Kaya, 2006; Kaya et al., 2010; Collings et al., 2010; Küskü and Ataman, 2011; 
Gürbüz and Mert, 2011). Throughout these large- scale reforms, which were also supported 
by the majority of the economic elites, the control on foreign currency was abandoned, the 
value of the Turkish Lira was determined by the market, foreign capital entry controls were 
suppressed (Öniş, 2004).  
 
The same period was also characterized by an attempt to combine Islamic identity with a 
liberal economy (Buğra, 2002; Laçinok, 2007; Özcan and Turunç, 2011; Başkan, 2010). This 
tendency was further enforced by the victories of pro-Islamist political parties in the 1990s 
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and 2000s. In particular, the pro-Islamist AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and 
Development Party) that took power in 2002, promised to respect the neo-liberal economic 
policies deployed since the 1980s. Prior to AKP rule, pro-Islamic parties were banned several 
times by the Constitutional Court under previous governments, on grounds of anti-secular 
activities destined to install an Islamic regime. Weary of these politically risky discourses, 
conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs needed a political organization that allied Islamic belief 
with pragmatism, but gave priority to private enterprise, free market, competition and profits 
(Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). 
 
Following economic liberalization, industrial production – which had formerly been 
primarily limited to Istanbul and the adjacent cities in the Marmara region - became scattered 
throughout Anatolia. This was due to the proliferation of export-oriented small and medium 
size enterprises operating in various industrial zones that reflected the dynamism of ambitious 
entrepreneurs moving from local to global markets, in some cases bypassing the national 
market (Keyman and Lorasdağı, 2010). This proliferation was also stimulated by the large 
businesses of Istanbul and the Marmara region, which outsourced part of their production to 
Anatolian companies (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010), while competing in international markets.  
 
The transition to a liberal economy, and the attempts to combine an Islamic identity with such  
a liberal economy, had a considerable influence on business networks (Başkan, 2010; Özcan 
and Turunç, 2011). A proliferation of businesspeople’s associations with a religious accent 
characterized the period following this economic and social transformation. The new 
Anatolian conservative economic and political elites, who once felt that they were socially 
and culturally “excluded”, savoured their common triumph and openly displayed their 
interest in securing their position among the established elites. The religiously conservative 
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entrepreneur groups, not only those dwelling in Anatolian cities, but also those operating in 
Istanbul and the Marmara region, were also willing to improve their social networks. As an 
alternative to the secular and pro-Western “Turkish  Association of Industrialists and 
Businesspeople” (TÜSİAD-Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği), founded in 1971 by 
the modernist, established economic elites of the Istanbul area, the  Anatolian  entrepreneurs, 
allied with the leading pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi), created MÜSİAD 
(Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği) “The Association of Independent  Industrialists 
and Businesspeople” in 1990 (Öniş and Türem, 2002; Pamuk, 2008). The first three letters of 
the designation “Müstakil”, meaning “independent”, was also read as “Muslim”. For these 
conservative entrepreneurs, Islamic identity served as capital, which could be deployed to 
satisfy the need for power, status and approval. By providing the grounds for work 
sociability, and consequently cooperation and coordination, this new network introduced 
dynamism and change. It also provided the opportunity to interact with the state apparatus 
during the rule of pro-Islamic parties, and to influence policies (Başkan, 2010). 
 
While TÜSİAD’s membership size is relatively small and composed of large firms located 
mainly in Istanbul and the surrounding areas, MÜSİAD’s membership size is larger, 
geographically widespread, and composed mainly of SMEs (Öniş and Türem, 2001, 2002; 
Sönmez, 2010) and young companies (Buğra, 2002). However, TÜSİAD’s members 
manufacture 65 per cent of the total industrial production, and their share in total exports is 
approximately 85 per cent (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010). Although TÜSİAD has considerable 
economic power, it lost the political support of the state apparatus during the pro-Islamist 
governments. As an alternative strategy, it has extended its international reach and has 
adopted a democratic discourse (Başkan, 2010). MÜSİAD has close ties with the pro-Islamist 
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parties, and intends to play a political lobbying role on behalf of its members (Öniş and 
Türem, 2001, 2002; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010).  
 
Another business network that shelters religiously conservative entrepreneurs, “The 
Confederation of Turkish Businesspeople and Industrialists” (TUSKON-Türkiye İşadamları 
ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu), was founded in 2005. Its founders and members mostly 
belong to the Fethullah Gülen
2’s religious community, however, and keep a certain distance 
from MÜSİAD (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010). According to Mango (2006), Gülen maintains a 
concept of the secular world as “dar-ul hizmet” (the abode of service to mankind), which he 
substitutes for the traditional notion of “dar-ul harb” (the abode of war against infidels). This 
perspective is similar to the basic tenet of other religiously inspired business networks, such 
as the Opus Dei, for the members of which all work should be performed as divine service 
(Mango, 2006).  In TUSKON, Islamic references are secondary to the deployment of 
nationalist discourses:  Islam is characterized as an important element of Turkish nationalism 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010:104). TUSKON provides a network for local SMEs willing to 
reach out to foreign markets and to source raw materials for their production. The impressive 
educational institutions created by Gülen’s followers in five continents, from Asia to Africa, 
and from Australia to America, are also helping to provide additional contacts for infiltrating 
global markets (Buğra and Savaşkan. 2010).  In these schools, the language of instruction is 
Turkish (along with English) and the curriculum familiarizes students with Turkish culture. 
These educational institutions are often attended by the children of the local elite, who can 
therefore easily be reached by TUSKON for business opportunities. 
 
                                                          
2
Former imam and preacher who established an internationally active and polically powerful religious 
community 
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A widely shared idea about the role of religion in Turkey is that it functions as a basis for the 
generation of a closed and defensive world concept. Consequently, religion has long been 
conceived as the main theme of a polarization between a modern attitude and a conservative 
posture (Mardin, 2004:82). Nevertheless, recent studies assert that religion in Turkey is not 
only coalesced with self-protectionist anti-modernism, but is also instrumental in providing 
personal inner guideline through a rapidly changing society, and facilitates integration in the 
globalized world (Göle, 1991, 2000). In the last decade, it appears that religious movements 
in Turkey have started to manifest themselves primarily within civil society organizations, 
and have distanced themselves from the strict ideology of political Islam (Yılmaz, 2005). In 
particular, the religiously rooted business associations have managed to produce a secularized 
discourse.  TUSKON linking with the Gülen’s movement is an appropriate example of this 
new discourse. They put great emphasis on the secular premises of business, rather than 
making Islamic values evident. Exploring the impact of this newly emerging religious middle 
class in the business world may also bring a new perspective to our understanding of network 
theory. Gülen’s movement and its business associations seem to represent, in this context, a 
new kind of brotherhood, a modern solidarity circle, within which traditional provincial 
conservatism, mostly nourished by small-scale subsidiary commerce, has closed around itself 
a protective shell against aggressively expanding modern/urban capitalism. It has been 
reconfigured through weak ties, as outlined by Granovetter, in the globalization process 
during the 2000s. In a TUSKON-type of business association, the members get together, not 
on the basis of close relationships such as familial links, or mutual relationships. Their 
cooperation is based on a market-based logic of interdependencies, which, on the surface, 
appear to share a conservative mixture of religious and national themes. In this sense, Turkey 
provides a rich context in which to study elites in the process of social, economic and 
political change. Evidence of differences between the new and the old elites allows for an 
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understanding of how elites change, or struggle to retain their elite status through their 
networks, which are influenced by the national context.  
 
Methodology 
 
The study sample was drawn from the owners and top managers of the largest Turkish 
companies, as part of a larger study on elites. A comprehensive study on Turkish business 
elites was conducted with the grant provided by the Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey in 2009-2011. We conducted open-ended interviews with key informants 
who have executive roles, such as CEOs, chair or vice chair of the board. The research 
sample consisted of 65 companies, taken from the 500 largest Turkish firms ranked by the 
Istanbul Chamber of Industry, and investigated elites pertaining to  different dimensions, such 
as relations with state and globalization, networking patterns, entrepreneurial attributes, and 
business and society interactions, among others.  Stratified random sampling according to the 
regional breakdown of the 500 largest companies was used to ensure a country-wide 
representation of the sample. A sub-sample of 36 interviewees who are the members of 
TÜSİAD/MÜSİAD/TUSKON was used for the present analysis, and this article is based on 
the area of data investigating elite networking patterns.  In this sample, the numbers of 
TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON members were 25, 4 and 7 respectively, which represents 
the changing elite-network composition.  Among the 500 largest companies, the respective 
number of firms affiliated with TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON are 142, 31 and 92. Elite 
networks are assessed through the membership of the largest businesspeople associations in 
Turkey: namely, TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON. The data concerning businesspeople’s 
associations were gathered both through interviews and secondary information sources. The 
life story of the person and the company, and the questions concerning relations with the 
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business networks constituted the basis of this analysis. The interview protocol was a broad 
guideline, which provided us with the opportunity to start with more general questions, and to 
ask for further details when necessary. To improve the accuracy of the responses, we assured 
each interviewee that their replies would be kept strictly confidential. We have replaced the 
names of the interviewees with pseudonyms, and we have hidden any identifying information 
in our research report. The interviews were conducted in the office of the interviewee. This 
has given us the opportunity to take field notes in relation to the office and the company. Two 
of the researchers participated in each interview, with the exception of two cases, where there 
was only one researcher. Interviews were tape-recorded, except in two cases, during which 
detailed notes were taken.  Interviews lasted for two to three hours. Each researcher also took 
observation field notes independently. An extensive documentary search was conducted in 
relation to each interviewee and firm. The data obtained through interviews was also cross-
checked with the archival data (such as member lists of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON, 
company reports, etc.) and observation field notes.  
 
In this study an exploratory qualitative research design was adopted, since the aim was to 
explore a research topic or theory, rather than being a test of it (Myers, 2009:23). Discourse 
analysis was applied to the interview data in order to examine the stability and dynamisms 
behind networking patterns, capitals and context. Following the suggestions of Boyatsis 
(1998), we have created codebooks from data as well as from theory. Each code was labelled 
and described. For reliability, the data was coded separately by two different researchers. As 
suggested by Boyatsis (1998), the theme was left out if the researchers could not reach a 
consensus on it, or it was re-formulated until an agreement was reached. Inter-rater reliability 
was over 80 per cent. 
----------------------------------------- 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Findings and Discussions 
 
Different business networks (in the form of businesspeople’s associations) accomplish 
specific functions, with sometimes complementing and mostly conflicting interests. 
Nevertheless, business associations are subject to the same contextual forces, such as the 
world economy, dynamics of international relations, and political setting, crises and social 
movements, as well as ideologically-driven trends on a national level at the same historical 
moment. However each business association is at a different stage of organizational 
evolution: whilst a long-established one like TÜSİAD is at the peak of its integration with the 
global market and is sufficiently mature,  new associations, like MÜSİAD or TUSKON, are 
in a growth phase, as they takes effective steps to be more active in the global market. In each 
emerging business network, we observe a gradual passage towards institutionalized 
relationships. Consequently, every new businesspeople association represents a transposition 
of peer-to-peer relationships from mostly affective proximity (family ties, ethnic mutuality 
bonds, etc.) to functionally conditioned trust networks. In other words, businesspeople 
associations are signs of a social change from traditionally determined forms of solidarity to 
institutionally circumscribed sociality, that help to carry out capitalistic actions in modern, 
formal or semi-formal structures. Ideology here functions as an apparently discursive 
coverage and a catalyst that accelerates the involvement of economic actors into global 
markets. In the context of global integration of Turkey, trust, which is indispensable for the 
creation of new relationships of solidarity, seems to be assured not exclusively by affective 
ties, which were once thought to be the sole criterion of eligibility between economic actors. 
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Now, it is also secured by institutional regularization through a certain ideological discourse. 
This discourse manifests itself as a secular, pro-Western, old-established bourgeois point of 
view in the case of TÜSİAD, as Islamic faith adapted into capitalist reasoning in the case of 
MÜSİAD, and as Islamic faith fused with a desire for internationalist position-taking with a 
slight emphasis on “Turkishness” in the case of TUSKON. In every new formation, weak 
ties, as Granovetter stressed, seem to have a more determinant role than traditional strong 
ties. Again, in every new network system, the logic of economic action is concretized through 
the formation of new social capital for establishing the ideological setting of domination in 
Bourdieusian terms. Each new cultural capital is generated in the conceptual framework of a 
businesspeople association. The degree of internationalization plays a major role in 
mobilizing resources with the aim of constituting such a social capital through weak ties. 
Table 1 displays differences between TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON in relation to their 
level of development on an international and national scale. 
 
We provide a three-layered framework through which we examine business networks in 
terms of their form and content in the global, national and association level relationships in 
the concluding section of this paper. We also elaborate how these layers of relationships 
interplay with each other. 
 
Macro-Global context of business network relations 
 
The business associations are about domination which leads to an exclusion of those who do 
not culturally conform, and they generate a feeling of incompatibility on the part of those 
who hit the barrier of the domination (Authors, 2011). Consequently, a new network, 
defining itself as ‘other’ than the one preceding it, emerges as sufficient need is condensed 
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around a motivational force towards a global market. This being ‘other’ is not only explicitly 
encoded in cultural assets, but also in specific needs, such as integration with the global and 
national economy as experienced by this specific group of businesspeople.  
 
Different networks agree on the aims of an economic mutuality for a growing business and 
global integration. This is how we can explain the synchronic existence of a series of 
networks, diverging culturally or ideologically, but completing an evolutionary landscape of 
the business world. As mentioned above, these businesspeople networks differ in the type and 
level of their needs. TÜSİAD members are big players, who are well connected with the rest 
of the world. They have mostly Western cultural references. Several of them have led major 
international associations in their business fields. They also appear to be members of the 
major international NGOs in their sector.  
 
It is interesting to note that there was no affiliation of international associations among 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members. There is a lack of integration with global networks. 
MÜSİAD/TUSKON members seem to be less familiar with foreign markets and cultures. In 
contrast to TÜSİAD members who had experienced foreign collaboration, even before the 
economic liberalization, newcomers like MÜSİAD and TUSKON members have mostly 
appeared in the largest companies list in Turkey, or grew after the policy change in 1980 (and 
grew even faster during the AKP rule after 2002). Being new in both national and 
international markets appears to be a constraining factor, especially in international business. 
However, particularly in the case of TUSKON, this is being overcome, thanks to the schools 
of Gülen all over the world (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010) which are attended, particularly in 
less developed countries, by the children of local elites.   In fact, a careful examination of the 
web page of TUSKON reveals that international relations with potential trade partners are 
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created and maintained by the activities of this association. Therefore, TUSKON serves as a 
business community, with strong religious ties and functions as a provider of access to 
international business networks. Thus, its members do not act individually in the international 
arena, but rather they are introduced to international markets through community-based 
activities offered to each member.  
 
“TUSKON performs great internationally. (…) Through business trips to many 
countries [organized by TUSKON] we had the opportunity to establish many new 
links. We have learned how to compete internationally.” (S1-Chairman of a 
manufacturing company-TUSKON member).  
 
Since the business contracts are assured through collective business trips, to or from a 
country, that are organized by TUSKON, participants reported investments in similar 
countries, for example Brazil, among TUSKON members. On the other hand, TÜSİAD 
members enjoyed the benefits of being members of an old association integrated with the 
world. Their “establishedness,” experience,and economic size provide the necessary means to 
conduct business through the community (TÜSİAD) and individually. 
 
“I have many partnerships. Many people cannot get along with Westerners but I work 
very well with them. I have a partnership with the major player in the sector in 
Germany. (…) This year, I have also been appointed to the International 
Communication Committee at TÜSİAD.” (S2-Chairman of a large group. TÜSİAD 
member). 
 
 23 
 
TÜSİAD members did not only establish individual trade partnerships, but they also acted as 
leaders in promoting trade relations with specific countries. Their efforts were also 
recognized by different states. Social capital, together with cultural capital, appears as crucial 
assets to mobilize intensified weak ties for improving business benefits, materially as well as 
symbolically. 
“I have been awarded the Royal Order of Merit of Spain by the King for promoting 
trade relations between the two countries.” (S2-Chairman of a large group-TÜSİAD 
member). 
They are also able to act as a liaison person in connecting the political leaders of different 
countries.  
“I am member of NGOs in Germany (…) As a successful entrepreneur I am quite 
influential. I have weight in political scene. In a book about me written by young 
people it is stated that I brought together the prime ministers.”(S15-Chairman of a 
large group-TÜSİAD member). 
 
Globalization and increasing international exchanges appear to be the main factors leading to 
stability and change in networks. The compatibility/incompatibility of such macro tendencies 
with the deployment of the capitals necessitates reconsideration of existing capitals and the 
potential of a network.   
 
Meso-National context of business network relations 
 
Business associations are also subject to the legacy of their foundation. We observe that the 
period of foundation, as in specific time and historical moment, institutes a different 
organizational habitus in each association. TÜSİAD was established in 1971 in an unstable 
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context characterized by social unrest and employer-employee conflicts, where social 
democrats and liberal conservatives used to compete for government. TÜSİAD was 
established to provide a network for the private sector, rather than to represent the interests of 
businesspeople (Buğra, 1998).  Both MÜSİAD and TUSKON emerged after 1980 when 
religious tone was remarkable in the discourse of government, together with the global rise of 
neo-liberal policies. Each network was established as a semi-reactionary movement towards 
the secular cultural codes represented by the older network. Therefore new forms of social 
capital as new quests for both integration with the global market and domination are achieved 
through functional exploitation of weak ties. 
 
Based on these perspectives, the present study investigates the inner dynamics of the Turkish 
business networks, as well as the forces in the context contributing to their survival. The 
changing political and economic climate after 1980 facilitated the rise and growth of new 
networks. The rise of Islamic tendencies at government level further encouraged new 
businesspeople networks, which appear to base their discourse on religion. This supportive 
environment was also reflected in the comments of the interviewees from 
MÜSİAD/TUSKON. 
 
“During the crisis the president of the republic visited us and showed his emotional 
support.” (S3-Chairman, TUSKON member of a large industrial holding). 
 
While he was proud of enjoying the support of the actual president, he was openly expressing 
his disappointment at the neglect of a previous president who did not share Islamist 
tendencies.  
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“Even though I create employment and export a considerable part of my production, 
previous president [of the republic] never invited me to the presidential palace. 
However, the actual president invites.” (S3-Chairman, TUSKON member of a large 
industrial holding). 
 
The old elite businesspeople network, TÜSİAD, did not appear to benefit from the same level 
of political support in the 2000s. The discourse of several of its members indicated a lack of 
support, even a counteraction from government. This is an explicit indication of the 
importance of the context-dependent nature of network and social capital. 
 
“The government wants to eradicate us.” (S4-CEO of TÜSİAD member of a large 
industrial holding). 
 
It is also argued that the new religious business class is the reason for the emergence of AKP 
(Başkan, 2010). In the post 1980s political atmosphere, the affinity between politics and 
religious businesspeople appears to be very appropriate for liberal policies. In fact, our 
research focuses on the transformation of the economic elites’ networks following the 
contextual shift, delineating a significant change in the relative position of religion among 
Turkish businesspeople. Despite the manifestation of nuanced attitudes, religion (the Islamic 
faith) in general seems to have become the primary common denominator in the new elites’ 
networks. 
 
“I am a TUSİAD member… TUSİAD is different. Since MÜSİAD,etc. have 
political inclinations I would not like to be involved in them. But I interact with 
all kind of groups in Ankara.” (S5-Chairman of a group). 
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 According to the findings of our study, the newly emerging economic elites, who are mostly 
from a provincial origin, adopt a more or less manifest religious attitude in their self-
expression and manners. The majority of MÜSİAD/TUSKON members in our study state 
that they fully practice their religious beliefs. However, they are highly motivated to 
construct business networks that aim for integration with the global liberal market, instead of 
preserving the reactionary conservative point of view. The apparent motive for rejecting the 
older social networks is always due to cultural heritage and ideological essence, because this 
does not offer, to the newcomer, the opportunity to establish new weak ties and a guarantee 
of economic and political power. New positioning needs the adoption of new values, while 
those evocative of the old social capital are reformulated. The non-members of TÜSİAD, for 
example, try to coalesce their conservatism with global values based on tolerance and 
democracy. 
 
“I am a faithful person. I fulfill all my religious duties, however, I am not fanatic. I 
would not mind for example going to a restaurant where alcohol is served. Or when I 
have a foreign client and we go for a dinner. He drinks alcoholic beverages at the 
same table. I would respect him. I have respect for every belief. I do not mind that he 
is Christian or Jewish or Armenian. I do have respect to all of them. Thanks God I am 
not fanatic.”(…)I am not a member of TÜSİAD. I do not share some of its views. 
TÜSİAD is not democratic. But I am not against trading with them.” (S6-Chairman of 
large group). 
Networking is not always a strict adherence to a certain business association, with or without 
political connotation, but, for some of our interviewees; it was a question of developing a 
sufficiently diversified social capital, as a safeguard against contextual fluctuations. 
 27 
 
 
“I do not have a membership in any association. However, my cousins, brothers [all 
partners in the same business group] are members somewhere. My cousin is a 
member of TUSKON, my brothers are member of TÜSİAD.” (S7-Chairman of a 
large group). 
 
Micro-association context of business network relations 
 
Every network is comprised of main components, the systematic cooperation evoking the 
establishment of a social capital, allowing in those who share the same cultural codes 
(cultural capital) and excluding those who do not. Similarly, those not sharing the same 
characteristics do not dare, or want, to become a part of the network. This was quite evident 
in the discourses of the businesspeople who did not join TÜSİAD, in full conformity with 
Bourdieu’s argument on the subjective evaluation of one’s probabilities in life practices being 
mostly legitimized by a corpus of discursive formulations or schemas of action, as in the 
example of “this is not for us”. (Bourdieu, 2000: 259) 
“TÜSİAD is too big for us.” (S8-Chairman and CEO in a holding from Istanbul). 
 
In fact, there are significant discrepancies between the economic, social and cultural capitals 
of the adherents of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON in our sample. Given the overlaps 
between the MÜSİAD and TUSKON members, and the commonalities in their religious tone, 
we preferred to put them together. Our findings show that TÜSİAD membership is associated 
with the largest economic power. Its members in our sample are usually from companies 
whose sales exceeded 500 million or even 1 billion USD. The association with relatively 
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smaller sized companies is worth noting in the cases of MÜSİAD and TUSKON members. 
Quotes of the TÜSİAD members often underline the size of their businesses: 
 
“We have the largest factory in the world in a single site.” (S9-CEO of a large group). 
 
It is interesting to note that they tend to express the size of their companies in comparison to 
the global or European scale. They make it explicit that they are able to compete in global 
markets. They also express their economic capital in terms of their international market share: 
  
 “We are the largest 3rd in market share in Europe.” (S10-Chairman of a large 
industrial group). 
 
The divergence between the respective cultural capitals of these different networks’ members 
is also considerable. TÜSİAD members appear to have an undergraduate degree, often from a 
university in the USA or UK. They are also likely to have a graduate degree.  The majority of 
TÜSİAD members are also graduates of prestigious high schools, where the language of 
instruction is foreign. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of this group seem to 
be able to speak more than one foreign language.  
 
Amongst this group, there seems to be a trend for collecting paintings and (to a much lesser 
degree) antiquities, as well as establishing private universities or museums bearing the name 
of the family. The growth of a cultural capital and its refinement into rare tastes plays a 
determinant role in the symbolic construction of domination, which also functions as an 
indication of the belonging of the actor to a well-rooted system of social relationships, and 
not to a newly emerging one. 
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“My interest is highest for plastic arts.  (…) I visit art exhibitions, select artworks in 
national and international biennales and art fairs. I have a great interest in [classical] 
music but unfortunately only as a spectator. I do not play any instrument. I am also 
interested in literature (…) I practise two types of sports: first is the one I do regularly 
as eating, sleeping (…) I have also favourite sports: I practise equitation since my 
childhood. My father introduced me to it. I do sailing since long time. I played soccer 
(…). I like skiing.” (S11-Chairman of a large industrial group-TÜSİAD member). 
 
While similar discourses have often been observed among TÜSİAD members, MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON members mentioned different tastes. The latter are usually interested in more 
popular sports and types of music, unsurprisingly, when we consider Bourdieu’s theoretical 
emphasis on the scale of sports practice and cultural tastes from the finest to the most 
popular, during the construction of the distinction. 
“I walk three days per week in the health club of the X Hospital. (…) I listen to the 
Turkish traditional popular music. (…)  I do not have any other relationship with art.” 
(S12-Chairman of a large industrial group- TUSKON member). 
 
MÜSİAD and TUSKON members in our sample seem to differ considerably from TÜSİAD 
members concerning the cultural capitals.  A large majority of the members do not have an 
undergraduate, or a graduate degree. The distance of the university from the home city 
appears to be a major problem, accounting for the limited time spent in educational 
institutions. The expectation that the older son should work in the family business was 
another reason which prevented further studies. 
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----------------------------------------- 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
However, it is also worth mentioning that the children of MÜSİAD and TUSKON members 
seem to achieve better education levels. They have undergraduate degrees,  some of them 
preferring US universities. They thus have a better education record and are able to speak 
foreign languages. Half of the TUSKON members in our sample could not speak another 
language. Most of them seem to have spent little time abroad, and then only for business 
trips. When we evaluate the presence of elite tastes as defined by Bourdieu, we see that such 
tastes are inexistent. For example, in contrast to TÜSİAD members, they do not collect 
paintings or antiquities. However, the trend of establishing universities is also observed 
amongst TUSKON members. While TÜSİAD members tend to establish their own private 
universities bearing the name of the family, TUSKON or MÜSİAD members favour a 
collective effort in similar endeavors. They get together with others of similar link to create 
new universities, usually for a “foundation” and get actively involved in the board of trustees. 
Their more collectivistic orientation is worth noting. 
“My son is the head of the board of trustees in our university.” 
 (S12-Chairman of a group-TUSKON member). 
 
They are usually proud of contributing to these joint efforts of founding new universities, 
which are mandated by the government, but often sponsored by large holding companies. 
However, although these are joint efforts, they tend to emphasize their own contributions. For 
them this is clearly a symbolic capital through which they gain legitimacy and reputation. 
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“I have constructed a Business and Economics Faculty. Ten people, we have provided 
4 trillion Turkish Liras ($2.2 million).” (S13-Chairman of an industrial company-
TUSKON member). 
 
Significant differences are also observed along the social capital dimension between 
TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD/TUSKON members in our sample. The notion of social capital 
appears to be the underlying concept of Bourdieu’s thinking on the phenomenon of 
domination (Bourdieu, 1979). He conceptualizes social capital as a sum of actual or potential 
resources deriving from the very fact of possessing a more or less institutionalized network of 
durable relationships. Social capital creating useful links displays various characteristics for 
the businesspeople networks we analyzed. One of the dimensions we wanted to assess is the 
father’s profession. In the case of TÜSİAD members, the fatherly profession appears to be 
“industrialist”. On the other hand “merchant” or “craftsman” appears as the father’s 
profession for the MÜSİAD/TUSKON members in our sample. The farmer is the only 
exception. Another dimension to assess social capital is the city of birth. Interestingly, we see 
that more than half of the TÜSİAD members in our sample were born in big cities 
(metropolitan areas). On the other hand, all the MÜSİAD/TUSKON members in our sample 
were born in small cities and towns (non-metropolitan areas). 
 
Interrelationships between macro, meso, and micro levels 
 
Given the findings of our study, we developed a model which is composed of interconnected 
parts, akin to a network that involves parts tied together with needs and functions that 
necessitate a form of organization, based on the use of cultural signs and a shared habitus to 
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nurture a trusting system which generates legitimacy, credibility, economic cooperation and 
ideology.  
 
The existing metropolitan-origin established business networks display mundane and 
Western-oriented cultural characteristics, while the new formations use religious themes and 
the explicit conservative attitude as a kind of ingredient of articulation with capitalist 
relations on a world scale. In other words, conservatism functions, in the rapidly changing 
social-economic context of Turkey, as a protective cocoon, a kind of anti-shock armour for 
the sufficiently motivated individual who desires to be integrated into the global market, but 
does not possess the necessary cultural equipment to support the logic of competitiveness. 
Even though the conservative new elite appear to refer to religious codes, they follow the old 
elites’ consumption style and “surround themselves with luxury brands, new villas and 
private beaches” (Özcan and Turunç, 2011: 77). Conservatism presents an appearance and a 
strategy of adaptation to the global economy and culture. We think that, from the bottom up, 
this represents an inevitable conflict triggered off by social change and forms of adaptation 
shared by conservative strata. Conservative elite networks provide the necessary tools to 
become integrated into the global economy. 
 
In spite of such a leaning towards the non-material aspects of globalization, the apparently 
conservative economic elite seems to approach values relative to a pluralistic point of view, 
with a remarkable tendency towards moral tolerance, and a systematic recognition of cultural 
differences, often intellectually supported through  traditional humanism  reminiscent of the 
Sufi philosophy of Rumi, or other historical Anatolian half-mythic references, which have 
produced a  flexible stance towards Islam for centuries. In fact, Turkish Islam has a 
traditional orientation towards the state that facilitated its pragmatic and flexible tone. In 
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other words, because Turkish Islam, as represented by religious functionaries, has 
traditionally done the state’s bidding, it accepted the secularist order without demur (Mango, 
2006:56). This flexible stance is also visible in the discourses of the MÜSİAD/TUSKON 
members: 
 
“…I do practise my religion, however I have many friends who do not. For example, I 
often go out with them for a dinner, they drink alcoholic beverages and I don’t and I 
do not mind it. Everybody is free to do what he/she wishes.” (S14-Male, chairman of 
an Anatolian company). 
 
This flexibility appears even when they sign up new members for the business associations. 
The president of a sub-federation of TUSKON states that: 
 
“We have one criterion when we sign up a new member; we don’t look at the political 
view, nor ethnicity. What we are looking for is straight/honest business history of the 
man/woman. This is the only criterion. We have members from different political 
views (left or right wing political parties). We have “Alevis” (A Turkish Shia sect). 
We have Kurds as well… We have members consuming alcohol, or smoking. But I 
personally don’t drink or smoke.” 
 
This trend may also be interpreted as yet another confirmation of the underlying attributes of 
a certain Volkislam, based on tolerance and flexibility, perpetuated by a series of mystical 
beliefs (Mardin, 1986:114).  However, what remains to be explored is the centrality of the 
different groups to power and influence in the networks in which they are located. There is a 
difference between being included and being supported. It has been observed that, in the 
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same company, one partner preferred to join the secular TÜSİAD and the other was a 
member of TUSKON.  The basic motivation here is to get access to economic wealth and 
global markets. The possession of the necessary economic, social and cultural capitals 
provides access to a specific network. For example when the company gets large enough 
economically, and the person has acquired cultural and symbolic capitals such as university 
diplomas, titles, etc., he/she may prefer to become a TÜSİAD member.  It is also worth 
noting that these networks are not isolated communities and there are exchanges between 
them.  The dynamic nature of the macro, meso and micro contexts stimulates and necessitates 
interrelations between networks, even though they appear as different cultural spheres.  
We outline below in a multilevel framework the role of the context in business networks and 
the respective significance of Granovetter and Bourdieu’s framing. 
 
Table 4: A layered framework for outlining the form and content of business networks  
Types of network 
Levels of context 
The old business network, 
i.e. TÜSİAD 
The new business networks, 
i.e. MÜSİAD/TUSKON 
Macro-global Mature relationships based 
on formal ties 
High sociability (both 
individually and 
networkwise) with 
international economic actors 
Emergent relationships with 
innovative and informal ties 
Emerging sociability (mainly 
networkwise) with 
international economic actors 
Meso-national Strong but weakening 
relationships with the state, 
based on economic interests. 
Strong relationships with the 
state, based on shared 
religious and regional 
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Declining power base and 
stable status 
affinities 
Increasing power base and 
status 
Micro-association Power and sociability based 
on economic interests, size of 
business, and a reputation for 
being secular, progressive 
and modernist 
 
Power and sociability 
originally based on religious 
and regional affinities. But 
more recently wider 
membership based on 
economic interests 
Interrelationship between 
layers 
Struggle to retain its 
traditional power and 
influence on government, 
through its economic 
influence and by building 
collaborations with the state 
Struggle to join the national 
and global economic elite, 
with new interest in 
secularized discourse.   
Granovetter Intensified weak ties with 
actors in the world economy, 
weak ties with religious 
networks 
Strong ties with the state, 
weak ties with the global 
economy  
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Bourdieu Old elite subject to new 
contextual pressures and 
different set of tastes and 
capitals, which are subject to 
change 
New elite subject to new 
contextual pressures and 
different set of tastes and 
capitals (including old 
elites’), which are subject to 
change 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We presented a triple-layered framework, which summarizes our findings on the form and 
content of new and old business networks, across macro, meso and micro levels of the 
context (See Table 3). The table also elaborates on the interrelationship between these levels 
and explicates how we combine the theorization of Granovetter with that of Bourdieu in order 
to account for continuity and change in business network relations in a dynamic political 
economy. Drawing on Granovetter, we illustrated how network relationships have changed, 
and by mobilizing Bourdieu, we showed that the emerging networks of elites did not only 
generate their own logics but also interfered with old elites in multiple ways, sustaining the 
logic of the elite field in the country. 
 
While established metropolitan business elites adopt values directly linked to global-liberal 
pluralistic ideology, through a mostly Western orientation in education and socialization, the 
newly emerging counterparts construct ties to the same economic rationale, by  preservation 
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of traditional seriousness, and not overly stabilized pluralism, together with an implicit open-
mindedness. It is observed that the degree of integration with the world-scale economic 
activities of the economic elites (e.g. exportation, distribution, provisory or permanent 
representation, production in foreign countries) enhances the capacity to develop global and 
liberal values.  
 
On the contrary, what constitutes the appearance (manifest discourse as well as physical 
aspects) is more or less furnished with the well-known attributes and symbols of the Islamic 
conservatism. This is where conservatism serves to establish social ties with ideologically-
driven businesspeople associations or networks. Yet, we should also consider that ‘economic 
institutions do not emerge automatically in response to economic needs’ and structurally 
embedded individuals seem to have a major effect in the formation of institutional relations 
(Granovetter, 1992:7).  These increased networks, in exchange, drive their high motivation 
towards the global liberal market, and provide additional tools for the continuation of 
growing commercial activity, while maintaining their conservatism in scope. The latter leads 
to promotion of religious matters without creating an explicit contradiction between them and 
the liberal mind.  
 
In the context of this paper, it would make sense to mention the genealogy of the concept of 
“secular”, which can be regarded as an unfolding of the essence of religion (Martin, 1978). 
Gauchet (1997) argues that Western secularism can only be understood through the 
historicity of Christianity. In his renowned book, Formations of the Secular, Asad (2003) 
explains the evolution of the concept of secularism from being a theological discourse to the 
freeing of property from church hands into private owners, and argues that every religion 
produces its own secularism. This historical root of secularism also clarifies the 
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understanding of “the secular” in the context of one of our conclusions concerning the 
emergence of the religious business elites in Turkey. Since Islam has a different historical 
background and dynamics (Metcalfe, 2007), the Christian roots of the secular have to be 
different from the Muslim ones. In the context of the religious businesspeople, this 
conclusion refers to the Muslim businesspeople’s transition towards a more rational and 
systematized way of doing business. The new Islamic discourse they have been producing 
can be regarded as signs of this secularization. 
 
To conclude, our findings show that national context matters (Leat and El-Kot, 2007), and 
that contextual transformation had its repercussions in both business elite characteristics and 
elite networks in Turkey. Our study also reveals the significance of emic framing of context 
and demography, as most of the contextual issues are unique and idiosyncratic, rather than 
ethic and formulaic (Tatli and Ozbilgin, 2012). Both in-group characteristics and needs and 
contextual trends seem to influence businesspeople networks. The desire to dominate or the 
possibility of recognizing different groups is related to the fit between the social, cultural and 
economic capitals possessed by the group and the contextual forces. We should also consider 
variability within national culture (Keles and Aycan, 2011). Political context, in particular the 
interplay of religion, state and employers are ignored in the network theory, which assumes 
that context is fixed, and not relevant to such theorization. In  this paper, we show the need to 
consider context more keenly, as institutional differences are often an outcome of unique 
historical paths, and we bring an assessment of power and context to Granovetter’s 
theorization. 
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Table 2. Businesspeople Associations 
Name Established 
in 
Headquarter
s at 
Foreign 
memberships 
Affiliated 
associations 
Foreign 
representatives 
Values Economic 
representation 
TÜSİAD 1971 
 
President: 
N.Ümit 
Boyner (F) 
1963 
Robert 
College + 
University of 
Rochester 
Economist. 
Financial 
manager 
Istanbul 
 
Governing 
Board 
General 
Assembly 
High 
Consulate 
Council  
[Former 
presidents of 
TÜSİAD + 
Former high 
bureaucrats] 
 
5 female 
members 
among 21 
board 
members 
2 female 
presidents 
Business 
Europe 
Businessmed 
UBCGE 
(Black Sea & 
Caspian) 
 
Local 
businessmen 
associations 
with a –SİAD 
suffix 
All Young-
SİADs 
TÜSİAD Berlin 
Branch 
TÜSİAD Beijing 
Branch 
TÜSİAD Paris 
Branch 
TÜSİAD 
Washington Rep. 
TÜSİAD EU 
Brussels Rep. 
 
Productivity 
Sustainable 
economic 
growth 
Liberal 
economy 
Democratic 
standards 
Human rights 
Integration to 
EU 
Secular 
Members in industry 
and services sectors: 
85% of corporate 
taxes 
65% foreign trade 
(energy sector not 
included) 
65% industrial 
production 50% of 
added value 
50% of registered 
employment 
 
 
In 2009, 142 
member companies 
were in the largest 
500 list. 
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MÜSİAD 1990 
 
President: 
O.Cahit 
Vardan 
(M) 
1962 
Istanbul 
Technical U. 
+ 
Ohio State U. 
Industrial.Eng
. 
Businessman 
Istanbul 
 
Governing 
Board 
General 
Assembly 
High 
Consulate 
Council (no 
info) 
 
No female 
among 21 
board member 
 İSHAD 
3100 members 
in 33 branches 
4700 members 
of which 1650 
are Young-
MÜSİAD 
15000 firms 
 
92 liaison offices 
in 43 countries 
“National 
Perspective” 
(Highly 
religious 
tendency 
favouring an 
industrial-
basis 
development 
for an 
independent 
national 
context) 
 
Self 
development 
as well as 
national 
progress 
$3 bn./year of 
investment 
$90 bn. of GNP 
(15%); 
15% of employment 
17% of foreign trade 
Small and middle 
size firms 
 
In 2010, 31 member 
companies were in 
the largest 500 list. 
 
TUSKON 2005 
 
President: 
Rıza Nur 
Meral 
(M) 
1958 
Middle East 
Technical U. 
Industrial 
Eng. 
Top manager 
Istanbul 
Board of 
directors 
Supervisory 
board 
Board of 
regulations 
General 
Assembly 
 
2 female/ 42  
directors 
 TİM member 
Federations: 7 
regional 
business 
federations 
Associations: 
160 
businessmen 
associations in 
80 districts 
Brussels 
Beijing 
Moscow 
Washington 
Conservative 
Pragmatist 
Pro-Fethullah 
Gülen 
Community 
[Influential 
religious 
solidarity 
group] 
 
Self interest 
oriented 
25000  businessman 
and entrepreneur 
members 
624 firms 
Small and middle 
size firms 
Growing companies 
 
In 2010, 92 member 
companies in the 
largest 500 list. 
Source: Collected from documents provided by TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD and TUSKON and their respective websites. 
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Table 3: Business Associations and Individual Characteristics of Their Members 
Name Economic 
capital 
Cultural capital 
Education 
Cultural capital 
Tastes 
Social capital 
Family 
TÜSİAD >500 million - 1 
billion USD 
 
Mostly large 
companies 
-Undergraduate degree often from a 
university in USA or UK.  
-Likely to have a graduate degree.   
-Often graduates of prestigious high 
schools where the instruction language is a 
foreign language.  
-Majority is able to speak more than one 
foreign language. Most of them have spent 
at least one year abroad. 
-Trend about collecting paintings and 
(to a much lower degree) antiquities 
as well. 
-Trend of establishing private 
universities bearing the name of the 
family. 
-Father profession industrialist 
-Half from non-metropolitan areas 
 
MÜSİAD-
TUSKON 
Mostly small 
and medium 
sized companies 
-Large majority does not have an 
undergraduate degree  
-None with a graduate degree. (The 
distance of the university to the city of 
dwelling appears as a major problem 
causing this limited time in educational 
institutions). 
- Half of the TUSKON members in our 
sample do not know any foreign language. 
Most of them seem to have spent little time 
abroad and only for business trips. 
 
-No collectors 
-Trend of getting together with 
similar others to create new 
universities usually for a 
“foundation” and getting actively 
involved in the board of trustees. 
-Father profession merchant or 
craftsman 
-All of them from non-metropolitan 
areas 
 
 
 
